In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two (...) important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education. (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the centuries-old tradition of casuistry and the concept of conscience in Kant’s writings. This book offers a detailed exploration of the period from Pascal’s Provincial Letters to Kant’s critique of probabilism and discusses his proposal of a (new) casuistry as part of an moral education. / Trotz der Hinweise an wichtigen Stellen in Kants Schriften richtet die Kantforschung ihre Aufmerksamkeit nur selten auf die Jahrhunderte währende Tradition der Kasuistik und den Begriff des Gewissens, der in (...) ihrem Rahmen ausgearbeitet wird. Eingehend untersucht wird in diesem Buch insbesondere der Zeitabschnitt von Pascals »Briefen in die Provinz« bis zu Kants eigener Kritik des Probabilismus und seinem Entwurf einer (neuen) Kasuistik als Teil der ethischen Methodenlehre. (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the centuries-old tradition of casuistry and the concept of conscience in Kant’s writings. This book offers a detailed exploration of the period from Pascal’s Provincial Letters to Kant’s critique of probabilism and discusses his proposal of a (new) casuistry as part of an moral education. *** -/- Die Debatte um Kasuistik und Probabilismus zählt zu den wichtigsten Themen der Moraltheologie und Moralphilosophie der frühen Neuzeit. In der enormen Verbreitung der Literatur über die Gewissensfälle (casus conscientiae) (...) und in der großen Resonanz der Lehre von den wahrscheinlichen Meinungen (opiniones probabiles) in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts findet sich ein wirkungsmächtiges Modell für die Analyse des moralischen Handelns, in welchem Universalität des Gebots und Kontingenz der Handlung, Notwendigkeit der Norm und individuelle Freiheit miteinander versöhnt werden. Dennoch erregt dieses Modell heftige Kritik, die in Pascals berühmtem Angriff in den Briefen in die Provinz (1656–1657) gipfelt. So beginnt für die Kasuistik und den Probabilismus eine lange Krise, welche die Entstehung der modernen Moralphilosophie und den Siegeszug des kantischen Paradigmas ankündigt. Die Krise von Kasuistik und Probabilismus fällt zusammen mit einer einsetzenden rigoristischen Reaktion der christlichen Moraltheologie sowohl katholischer als auch protestantischer Prägung,welche die moralischen und spekulativen Folgen eines Rückgriffs auf Gewissensfälle und wahrscheinliche Meinungen als inakzeptabel ablehnt. Die Ablehnung geht aber weiter und dringt bis in den Kern der philosophischen Reflexion vor: Die rigoristische Reaktion gegen Kasuistik und Probabilismus entzündet sich im moralphilosophischen Denken Kants als Folge seiner umfassenden kritischen Revision der Grundbegriffe der Moralphilosophie sowie insbesondere seiner Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Gewissen und praktischem Urteil. Dem Grundsatz des Probabilismus setzt Kant das Kriterium der moralischen Gewißheit („quod dubitas, ne feceris!“) entgegen, das er als „Postulat des Gewissens“ bezeichnet (RGV 6:185.23–186.9).Und die Kasuistik wird als eine „Critic der Handlungen nach Sophistic“ abgestempelt, als eine „Uebung, um nach der Sophistic das Gewissen zu hintergehen oder es zu chicaniren, insofern man es in Irrthum zu setzen denkt“ (V-MS/Vigil 27:620.2–5). Dennoch weist Kant den kasuistischen Fragen eine herausragende Stellung in der Tugendlehre zu und legt der Kasuistik im Rahmen der ethischen Methodenlehre, also im Hinblick auf pädagogische Anwendungen, letztlich eine positive Funktion bei. Vermutlich ist Kants Angriff auf Kasuistik und Probabilismus durch den Einfluss Pascals philosophisch vermittelt. Kants Verhältnis zu Pascal und, allgemeiner, zu dem historischen Hintergrund, welchem dieser angehört, sind gleichwohl noch erstaunlich wenig erforscht: Trotz der wiederholten (stillschweigenden oder sogar ausdrücklichen) Hinweise an wichtigen Stellen in Kants Schriften richtet die Kant-Forschung ihre Aufmerksamkeit nur selten auf die Jahrhunderte währende Tradition der Kasuistik und den Begriff des Gewissens, der in ihrem Rahmen ausgearbeitet wird. Aus dieser langen Geschichte wird in diesem Band insbesondere der Zeitraum „von Pascal bis Kant“ eingehend untersucht, d.h. der noch wenig erkundete Zeitabschnitt von der beißenden Polemik von Pascals Briefe in die Provinz bis zu Kants eigener Kritik des Probabilismus und seinem Entwurf einer (neuen) Kasuistik als Teil der ethischen Methodenlehre. (shrink)

This essay deals with the recent book Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Volume 2, edited by Glenn W. Most (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022). After assessing its merits and shortcomings, it makes some general points about current publishing, research ethics, and the dangers of co-optation in collaborative work.

Poesie sul tempo, il cosmo, l'infinito e l'umanità, in un percorso che va da ottobre 2017 a maggio 2018.

The book covers scientific and philosophical topics by bringing them closer to literature. Some topics are scientific explanation, the concept of cause, rational argumentation, pseudoscience, language, ethics, philosophy of mind, posthumanism, and democracy. Summary Prefazione di Severino Saccardi. Introduzione. Capitolo 1: Le scrivanie di Eddington. 1.1. Il vecchio Qfwfq (I. Calvino. Le cosmicomiche). 1.2. L’assassino invisibile (L.F. Celine, Il dottor Semmelweis). 1.3. Gli gnommeri di Ingravallo (C.E. Gadda, Quer pasticciaccio brutto de via Merulana). 1.4. I sergenti di Napoleone (L. Tolstoj, (...) Guerra e pace). 1.5. Tex e il Coyote nero (G. Bonelli, Il Coyote nero). 1.6. “Elementare Watson!” (A.C. Doyle, Il segno dei quattro). Capitolo 2. Non saranno mai delusi. 2.1. L’albero di Natale. (V. Perrin, Cambiare l’acqua ai fiori). 2.2. Il dagherrotipo di Buendia. (G.G. Marquez, Cent’anni di solitudine). 2.3. Don Ferrante e la peste. (A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi). Capitolo 3. Capitolo puffo. 3.1. L’Accademia di Lagado. (J. Swift, I viaggi di Gulliver). 3.2. Bruto è uomo d’onore. (W. Shakespeare, Giulio Cesare). 3.3. Le oche mute. (G. Orwell, 1984). Capitolo 4. “Quarantadue!” 4.1. Lo zio N’Ba N’Ga. (I. Calvino, Le cosmicomiche). 4.2. La mosca cocchiera. (J. de La Fontaine, Favole). 4.3. Il fiore del dr. Dek. (E. Salgari, Le meraviglie del Duemila). Capitolo 5. L’ultimo uomo. 5.1. La pernice accusatrice. (Cyrano de Bergerac, Gli stati e gli imperi del Sole). 5.2. Pallino in via Mjasnickaja. (M.A. Bulgakov, Cuore di cane). Capitolo 6. Scenari perturbanti. 6.1. Dissipatio. (G. Morselli, Dissipatio H.G.). 6.2. Un mammifero meccanizzato. (S. Butler, Erewhon). 6.3. Mlle Olimpia. (E.T.A. Hoffmann, Racconti notturni). Capitolo 7. La gente perbene. 7.1. La balena bianca. (H. Melville, Moby Dick). 7.2. Betsabea Everdeene. (T. Hardy, Via dalla pazza folla). 7.3. Un’idea francese. (C. McCarthy, Cavalli selvaggi). 7.4. Le montagne del Montana. (D. Delillo, Rumore bianco). (shrink)

Tommaso Giannini was a prominent professor at the ferrarese Studium between sixteenth and seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platonicorum liber unus, which was a catalyst for his academic career. A compilative work in essence, the De providentia displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, (...) Teofilo Zimara, Bessarion, Agostino Steuco and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarcus, Sirianus, Proclus, Giamblicus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. A small place is reserved to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and precisely to his Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem. The aim of the paper is to provide a supplement of analysis of Giannini’s interest in Pico’s works considering his later writings, each one commonly identified as Disputationes Aristotelicae. (shrink)

The notion of Providence is born with the Greek word prόnoia which, however, originally meant "premeditation" (of a crime) or "design" of an artefact, and had nothing to do with religion. It was Plato in the Timaeus who adopted the word from the common language to indicate the rational and benevolent principle that inspired the anonymous God, which he defined as dēmiourgόs (also this word originally meant a professional technician, for example, a doctor or an architect) in his work of (...) shaping the cosmos. The doctrine of divine Providence was taken up by Middle Platonism, and with it the need to "justify" the divinity for the presence of evil in the world, what Leibniz will call "theodicy". Stoicism also supported Providence, but here there is no "theodicy" because in Stoic philosophy rationality and beneficial purpose are intrinsic to the cosmic process and therefore there is no external architect to be charged and absolved. Christian authors of the first centuries recycled the arguments of the Platonists in support of Providence, despite the fact that the word prόnoia never appears in the New Testament, nor is there any Hebrew equivalent in the Tanak. Perhaps there is some compatibility problem between the philosophical theory of Providence and the biblical-Christian view of God. (shrink)

Cosmovisione è un termine che dovrebbe significare un insieme di fondamenti da cui emerge una comprensione sistemica dell'Universo, delle sue componenti come la vita, il mondo in cui viviamo, la natura, il fenomeno umano e le sue relazioni. Si tratta, quindi, di un campo della filosofia analitica alimentato dalle scienze, il cui obiettivo è questa conoscenza aggregata ed epistemologicamente sostenibile su tutto ciò che siamo e conteniamo, che ci circonda e che in qualche modo si relaziona con noi. È qualcosa (...) di antico quanto il pensiero umano e, oltre a utilizzare elementi di cosmologia scientifica, racchiude tutto ciò che nella filosofia e nella scienza si riferisce all'universo e alla vita. Una cosmovisione non è un insieme d’idee, ipotesi e presupposti, ma un sistema basato su osservazione, analisi, prove e dimostrazione. Nessuna cosmovisione intende definire, stabilire, proporre, ma solo comprendere, analizzare e interpretare. Ognuno di noi costruisce e porta avanti la propria cosmovisione per tutta la vita, senza stabilire forme, come sfondo per il proprio pensiero e comportamento. Linguisticamente il termine “cosmovisione” deriverebbe dal tedesco, equivalente al concetto di“Weltanschauung”, utilizzato da diversi filosofi. Tuttavia, questa relazione linguistica non è applicabile perché contraddice ciò che proponiamo come cosmovisione. Questa parola tedesca rimanda a una visione prelogica o proto-sperimentale della realtà, con un contesto intuitivo e lontana da una conoscenza critica che non esisteva ancora al momento della sua formulazione. Senza dubbio, le cosmovisioni, nel senso in cui le intendiamo, ospitano e utilizzano questi elementi proto-sperimentali o prelogici che includono la storia, l’inconscio collettivo e tutti gli archetipi che portiamo con noi. Tuttavia, nel concetto che qui applichiamo, la cosmovisione va ben oltre questo contenuto, dapprima sottoponendolo costantemente al pensiero critico attuale e, infine, facendo dell'esperienza analitica (e non del pensiero o dell'intuizione stessa) il suo universo reale. In questo lavoro, cerchiamo di delineare una cosmovisione basata sulle realtà che la scienza offre oggi. Non proponiamo, in nessun momento, di fare scienza; o teorizzare la filosofia, ma cercheremo sempre di essere supportati da loro o, almeno, protetti da loro dalle distorsioni cognitive che abitualmente ci portiamo dietro. (shrink)

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s philosophical view. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point at some lines of (...) development of phenomenology that are revealed by Parrini’s reflection, through the comparison between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model, and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)

The terms “destiny” and “fate” are often used interchangeably in common parlance. In the course of history, in its relation to morality and religion, fate has sometimes prevailed over destiny as an irrational law or necessity capable of determining the course of events according to an inscrutable order. Scheler— whose philosophy inspired this contribution on authenticity as a fundamental quality of one’s identity—excludes all possible forms of fatalism. In this regard, he phenomenologically distinguishes “destiny” from “individual destination” or “vocation” (individuelle (...) Bestimmung). On his view, it is only by identifying the first with the second, or rather by identifying a set of personal data, traditions, characters, and environments with the specific task that each of us has been called on to carry out in the moral cosmos, that fatalism can arise—where fatalism is linked to the necessity of the world and the absolute impossibility of carving out spheres of human freedom within it. This paper deals precisely with the link between the phenomenon of authenticity and the concept of a person’s vocation. How can we “be” or “become” our authentic selves if we do not know ourselves? If we do not feel what we really love or prefer? If we never feel the breath of freedom? This paper focuses on the role that otherness, understood as effective exemplarity, plays in the formation and moral growth of essential individuality. I will argue, from a Schelerian perspective, that the discovery of the “true” or “ideal” self and the exercise of freedom—as presuppositions of all authentic behavior—do not exclude but rather require the ability to establish meaningful interpersonal relationships. The aim of this work is to offer an axiological, dynamic-relational and embodied model of authenticity. (shrink)

Tommaso Giannini (1556-1638) was a prominent professor at the Ferrara Studium between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platonicorum liber unus, which was a catalyst for his academic career. His De providentia displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, Teofilo Zimara, (...) Bessarion, Agostino Steuco, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarch, Sirianus, Proclus (read through Teofilo Zimara and Leonico Tomeo), Iamblichus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. Though a compilative work, the De providentia retains nonetheless a great importance insofar as it contributes to focus the bibliotheca platonica of the time, furthermore in the same years and place of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’s teaching. (shrink)

La Cappella Carafa di Santa Severina, nella chiesa di San Domenico Maggiore a Napoli, era uno dei luoghi preferiti della giovinezza di Giordano Bruno. La sua struttura, che ricorda il teatro di Giulio Camillo, e la presenza di trenta simboli astrologici scolpiti sugli archi, la rendono la “stanza della memoria” ideale per l’applicazione dell’innovativa arte della memoria sviluppata dal filosofo Nolano. -/- The ‘memory place’ of Giordano Bruno. The Carafa of Santa Severina Chapel in the church of San Domenico (...) Maggiore, Naples, was one of the favourite places of Giordano Bruno’s youth. Its structure, similar to that of Giulio Camillo’s theatre, and the presence of thirty astrological symbols carved on the arches, make it the ideal ‘memory place’ for the application of the innovative ‘art of memory’ developed by the philosopher. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to The Metaphysicist, the second Information Philosopher website, a work in progress on some classical questions in philosophy that 20th-century logical positivists and analytic language philosophers dis-solved as pseudo-problems. -/- The Metaphysicist analyzes the information content in twenty classic problems in metaphysics - Abstract Entities, Being and Becoming, Causality, Chance, Change, Coinciding Objects, Composition (Parts and Wholes), Constitution, Free Will or Determinism, God and Immortality, Identity, Individuation, Mind-Body Problem, Modality, Necessity or Contingency, Persistence, Possibility and (...) Actuality, Space and Time, Truth, Universals, Vagueness, and the 20th-century problem of WaveParticle Duality. -/- The Metaphysicist also includes pages on the classic paradoxes and puzzles used for millennia to wrestle with these metaphysical problems The Debtor’s Paradox, Dion and Theon, The Growing Argument, The Infinite Regress, The Problem of the Many, The Ship of Theseus, The Sorites Puzzle, The Statue and the Clay, and Tibbles, the Cat. -/- Information philosophy is a new philosophical methodology that goes “beyond logic and language” to the underlying information structures in the cosmos, in the world, in biological systems, and in the human mind - structures without which logic, language, and science would be impossible. (shrink)

Mystice videre: un modo particolare di vedere, sperimentato, lungo la storia dell’umanità, da coloro che hanno vissuto un’esperienza straordinaria di incontro con il sacro (termine che qui utilizzo nella sua accezione più ampia, di “ciò che è separato da” tutto ciò che è ordinario). Alludo ai mistici, ovviamente. Qualcuno, clinicamente parlando, potrebbe considerarli, con qualche ragione, individui patologici, ma sotto il profilo religioso si tratta di persone che hanno avuto la grazia di un incontro con il divino attraverso visioni profonde, (...) che, dalle tenebre del mistero, li hanno portati alla pienezza della luce interiore e hanno fatto sì che lo splendore che li ha illuminati si irradiasse all’esterno, dando un senso non solo al loro mondo interiore, ma anche al mondo che li circondava. Questo fecondo dinamismo tra “ciò che sta dentro” e “ciò che sta fuori” vale in tanti campi dell’esperienza umana, non solo nell’ambito del sacro, ma è in quest’ultimo che, elettivamente, l’attentio cordis determina l’irruzione nell’ombra di una luce che trasforma e permette di comprendere se stessi e l’intero cosmo. (shrink)

ABSTRACT (ENG) One of the concerns of Greek philosophy centred on the question of how a manifold and ordered universe arose out of the primitive state of things. From the mythical accounts dating around the seventh century B.C. to the cosmologies of the Classical period in Ancient Greece, many theories have been proposed in order to answer to this question. How these theories differ in positing a “something” that pre-existed the ordered cosmos has been widely discussed. However, scholars have rarely (...) made explicit how they differ in style of thought. In the span of four centuries the first deductive arguments of the Eleatic philosophers culminated in the emergence of logical proof and a form of explanation of natural phenomena, which consisted of searching for the simplest and fewest premises and deducting implications. In this paper it will be discussed how, at distinct stages of its development, the deductive thinking informed the solutions proposed to solve the chaos-order problem, that of how an ordered universe has been possible. -/- ABSTRACT (ITA) Una delle più importanti questioni della filosofia greca è stata quella di comprendere come sia stato possibile un universo ordinato a partire da uno stato primordiale. Dalle teogonie del VII secolo a.C. fino alle cosmologie dei filosofi dell’età classica, sono state proposte diverse teorie per dare risposta a questa domanda. Come esse differiscano nel postulare l’esistenza di un “qualcosa” di primordiale che preesisteva all’ordine del cosmo è stato molto discusso. Pochi studiosi, però, le hanno esaminate sullo sfondo della lenta evoluzione del pensiero deduttivo, culminata nella dimostrazione in geometria e in una forma di spiegazione dei fenomeni che consisteva nel cercare semplici premesse e inferire conclusioni. In questo articolo si mostrerà come il lento affermarsi della spiegazione razionale prima, dell’argomento deduttivo e della dimostrazione in geometria poi, abbiano dato forma alle diverse risposte al problema caos-ordine, e in particolare alla domanda su come sia sorto un universo ordinato. (shrink)

il verbo latino «desiderare» deriva dal composto latino della particella "de-" con il termine "-sideris", plurale di "sidera", che significa pertanto "stelle". Quindi il desiderio non ha a che fare con una singola stella, ma con un insieme di stelle. Perché? Gli antichi collegavano idealmente nel cielo le stelle fino a formare le costellazioni, e queste erano necessarie non solo per orientarsi (ad es. nel mare), ma anche a livello esistenziale (l’astrologia). Il problema è che finora la parola de-Sidera è (...) stata interpretata come il sentimento di una «mancanza» di costellazioni, cioè di punti di orientamento, magari con stravaganti riferimenti al De bello gallico di Giulio Cesare. In queste pagine del 2017 dimostro che è possibile una interpretazione alternativa partendo dall'interpretazione della particella "de-" in quanto finora essa è stata interpretata unicamente come un prefisso privativo. Eppure "de-" oltre a un significato privativo nel senso di sentire la mancanza di stelle, può indicare anche una negazione. In pratica interpretare de-siderare nel senso di nostalgia delle stelle sarebbe come interpretare de-costruire come "nostalgia delle costruzioni"! In realtà de-Sidera non significa affatto nostalgia delle stelle, bensì, molto più radicalmente «de-Costellare» nel senso di negare la costellazione che imprigiona e abbruttisce la mia esistenza attuale negli affanni della routine quotidiana, per cercare, oltre tale costellazione fatalistica, cioè il DESTINO, quella che corrisponde meglio alla mia vera DESTINAZIONE, nel senso di vocazione. Il de-siderio non è quindi nostalgia delle stelle, ma ricerca della costellazione che corrisponde alla propria vocazione. (shrink)

Demonstrates the sophistication of Seneca’s Stoicism by setting his contributions within the context of his school. Seneca’s contributions to physics, metaphysics, logic, determinism, theodicy and eschatology are set within a systematic reconstructions of Stoic positions. Ample documentation of sources and scholarship as well as the thematic, handbook-like structure allow for this book to be used as a look-up tool and introduction to the Stoic cosmos and the place of humans within it. -/- There are a number of new readings and (...) interpretations, e.g. concerning the corporeality of the principles; mixture (krasis di’ holôn); the elements and pneuma; identity; the relation of God and humans; Seneca’s attitude to logic; Seneca’s philosophy of time; the role of lekta in defining reality and action; Stoic and Senecan theodicy; Seneca’s contribution to the determinism debate. (shrink)

Modern scholarship on Late Antique philosophy seems to be more interested than ever before in examining in depth convergences and divergences between Platonism and Early Christian thought. Plotinus is a key gure in such an examination. is paper proposes a pre- liminary study of the Plotinian concept of aptitude, as it emerges throughout the Enneads and aims at shedding light to certain aspects of Plotinian metaphysics that bring Plotinus into dia- logue with the thought of Church fathers by means either (...) of similarities or di erences between Neoplatonist and Christian thought. It will be argued that the concept of aptitude is crucial as it involves the relation between the One and the many, the reality of participation, the relation of the cosmos with, and its dependence on, the superior spheres of being, the bestowal of divine gi s upon beings, and the possibility of the dei cation of the human being. (shrink)

This paper rehabilitates the Stoic conception of blending from the ground up, by freeing the Stoic conception of body from three interpretive presuppositions. First, the twin hylomorphic presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an incorporeal. Then, the atomistic presupposition that body is absolutely full and rigid, and the attendant notion that resistance (antitupia) must be ricochet. I argue that once we clear away these presuppositions about body, the (...) foundations of Stoic corporealism fall into place. Body is fundamental (not hylomorphic). The two fundamental principles (archai) are bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē); and these two bodies are two, not matter and form all over again, nor actual and potential, but agent and patient. The independence of the two archai is no threat to the unity of the cosmos, however, because the Stoic theory of body allows for the complete coextension of the archai. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of the wax and its shape? The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient completely coextended in a through and through blend. (shrink)

L’osservazione della natura con l’intento di capire l’origine della varietà di forme e fenomeni in cui si manifesta ha origini remote. All’inizio il rapporto con i fenomeni naturali era dominato da sentimenti quali paura e stupore che conducevano a supporre l’esistenza di entità sfuggenti alla percezione diretta che permeavano gli elementi animandoli. Ecco dunque che la magia rappresenta l’elemento dominante della filosofia naturale primitiva caratterizzata da una unicità degli eventi e dalla impossibilità di capirli e dominarli in quanto frutto della (...) volontà di essenze a noi estranee e non governabili. Con il nascere della civiltà ed il suo progredire il tempo dedicato ai lavori necessari per il sostentamento e la sopravvivenza diminuì e nella ripartizione dei compiti alcuni individui potevano dedicare parte del loro tempo alla osservazione della natura ed alla sua interpretazione in termini non trascendenti. Nella natura, intesa come tutto ciò che ci circonda composto da esseri viventi e da materia inorganica nelle sua varie aggregazioni sulla terra e nel cosmo, ciò che attirò l’attenzione fin dall’inizio furono furono i fenomeni regolari e periodici come i moti della luna, dei pianeti e delle stelle. Nel contempo dopo una spinta iniziale dettata da esigenze pratiche come contare gli oggetti o misurare i campi, la matematica si era sviluppata autonomamente e si rivelò idonea a descrivere in termini quantitativi i moti dei corpi celesti. La terra era al centro dell’universo mentre il moto degli altri corpi celesti risultava da una composizione di moti circolari uniformi. Questa visione geocentrica e pitagorica (armonia delle sfere) dell’universo ha prevalso fino agli albori della scienza moderna, anche se una descrizione eliocentrica, basata su validi argomenti, era stata proposta. Per quanto riguarda la struttura della materia i presocratici avevano già proposto i quattro elementi mentre gli atomisti avevano ricondotto tutto ad entità elementari primigenie, il cui aggregarsi e disgregarsi da luogo a tutti gli stati e le molteplici forme della materia. Queste intuizioni si ritrovano nella fisica moderna che contempla quattro stati di aggregazione, che hanno come unico sostrato comune gli atomi. La fisica moderna nasce con Galileo e Newton, la cui dinamica si sviluppa a partire dalle leggi di Keplero che descrivono il moto dei pianeti nel sistema eliocentrico, per potersi poi applicare ad un qualunque sistema materiale. Pertanto nei due secoli successivi si ritenne che un modello meccanico potesse essere sviluppato per un qualunque sistema fisico e quindi per l’universo intero la cui evoluzione doveva essere matematicamente prevedibile. Per i fenomeni termici tuttavia vennero formulate leggi ad hoc come quelle della termodinamica che mostrano come i processi macroscopici siano irreversibili in contrasto con le leggi della meccanica. Si deve a Boltzmann1 il tentativo di ricondurre la termodinamica alla meccanica per un gran numero di particelle dei cui moti disordinati viene data una lettura di carattere statistico. L’aumento della entropia e la irreversibilità seguono dalla ipotesi di caos molecolare ossia che i moti siano così disordinati che si perde rapidamente memoria dello stato iniziale. L’idea di introdurre una misura di probabilità nel contesto della meccanica sembra antitetica con la natura stessa della teoria rivolta fino ad allora allo studio di sistemi con moti regolari, reversibili e prevedibili individualmente su tempi lunghi. Tuttavia l’analisi probabilistica diventa essenziale per lo studio di sistemi caratterizzati da forti instabilità, e da orbite irregolari per i quali la previsione richiede una conoscenza della condizioni iniziali con precisioni fisicamente non raggiungibili. Combinando la evoluzione deterministica della meccanica di Newton o di Hamilton con la descrizione statistica attraverso una opportuna misura invariante di probabilità nello spazio delle fasi, nasce la teoria dei sistemi dinamici2 che consente di descrivere non solo i sistemi ordinati o i sistemi caotici ma anche tutti quelli che vedono coesistere in diverse proporzioni ordine e caos e che presentano una straordinaria varietà di strutture geometriche e proprietà statistiche, tanto da fornire almeno se non proprio un quadro teorico per lo meno metafore utili per la descrizione dei sistemi complessi. Anche se non c’è unanime consenso ci sembra appropriato definire complessi non tanto sistemi caratterizzati da interazioni non lineari tra i suoi componenti e da proprietà emergenti, che rientrano a pieno titolo nel quadro dei sistemi dinamici, ma piuttosto i sistemi viventi o quelli di vita artificiale che ne condividono le proprietà essenziali3. Tra queste possiamo certamente annoverare la capacità di gestire la informazione e di replicarsi, consentendo tramite un meccanismo di mutazione e selezione di dare origine a strutture di crescente ricchezza strutturale e dotate di capacità cognitive sempre più elaborate. Una teoria dei sistemi complessi non esiste ancora, anche se la teoria degli automi sviluppata da Von Neumann4 e la teoria della evoluzione di Darwin5 ne possono fornire alcuni pilastri importanti. Recentemente la teoria delle reti è stata utilizzata con successo per descrivere le proprietà statistiche delle connessioni tra gli elementi costitutivi (nodi) di un sistema complesso6. Le connessioni che non sono né completamente casuali né completamente gerarchiche, consentono una sufficiente robustezza rispetto a malfunzionamenti o danneggiamenti dei nodi unita a un adeguato livello di organizzazione per consentirne un funzionamento efficiente. Nei sistemi fisici il modello base è un insieme di atomi o molecole interagenti, che danno luogo a strutture diverse quali un gas, un liquido o un cristallo, come risultato di proprietà emergenti. Nello stesso modo per i sistemi complessi possiamo proporre un sistema automi interagenti come modello base. Le molteplici forme che il sistema assume anche in questo caso vanno considerate come proprietà emergenti del medesimo sostrato al mutare delle condizioni esterne e frutto delle i replicazioni, ciascuna delle quali introduce piccole ma significative varianti. Questa è la grande differenza tra un sistema fisico ed un sistema complesso: il primo fissate le condizioni esterne ha sempre le medesime proprietà, il secondo invece cambia con il fluire del tempo perché la sua organizzazione interna muta non solo al cambiare di fattori ambientali ma anche con il succedersi delle generazioni. C’è dunque un flusso di informazione che cresce con il tempo e che consente agli automi costituenti ed alla intera struttura di acquisire nuove capacità. Questo aumento di ordine e ricchezza strutturale avviene naturalmente a spese dell’ambiente circostante, in modo che globalmente i la sua entropia cresce in accordo con la seconda legge della termodinamica. In assenza di una teoria formalizzata paragonabile a quella dei sistemi dinamici, per i sistemi complessi si possono fare osservazioni e misure, sia puntuali sui costituenti elementari e sulle loro connessioni, sia globali sull’intero sistema, oppure costruire modelli suscettibili di essere validati attraverso la simulazione. Se di un sistema si riesce infatti a fornire una descrizione sufficientemente dettagliata, è poi possibile osservare come questo si comporti traducendo le regole in algoritmi e costruendo quindi una versione virtuale, anche se semplificata del sistema stesso. Il passaggio più difficile è il confronto tra il sistema simulato ed il sistema vero, che passa necessariamente attraverso la valutazione di una numero limitato di parametri che ne caratterizzino e proprietà. La codifica del progetto è una proprietà cruciale dei sistemi complessi perché questa si realizza con un dispendio di massa ed energia incomparabilmente più piccolo rispetto a quello necessario per realizzare l’intera struttura; nello stesso tempo apportare piccole modifiche ad un progetto è rapido ed economico. In questo processo che comporta la continua introduzione di varianti si aprono molteplici strade e con lo scorrere del tempo si realizza una storia in modo unico e irripetibile. Anche il susseguirsi di eventi fisici caratterizzati da processi irreversibili e dalla presenza di molteplici biforcazioni da origine ad una storia che non si può percorrere a ritroso, né riprodurre qualora fossimo in grado ripartire dalle stesse condizioni iniziali. Tuttavia esiste una differenza profonda tra la storia di un sistema fisico come il globo terrestre e la storia della vita. La prima registra i molteplici cambiamenti che ha subito la superficie del nostro pianeta ove montagne e mari nascono e scompaiono senza un chiaro disegno soggiacente. La storia della vita è caratterizzata da una progressiva crescita della ricchezza strutturale e funzionale e accompagnata da una crescita della complessità progettuale. La rappresentazione di questa storia prende la forma di un albero con le sue ramificazioni che mostra la continua diversificazione delle strutture e la loro evoluzione verso forme sempre più avanzate. La direzione in cui scorre il tempo è ben definita: le strutture affinano le capacità sensoriali mentre cresce la potenza degli organi che elaborano la informazione. Un sistema complesso è anche caratterizzato da un molteplicità di scale, tanto più alta quanto più si sale sulla scala evolutiva. La ragione è che il procedere verso strutture sempre più elaborate avviene utilizzando altre strutture come mattoni per cui l’immagine che si può fornire è quella di una rete di automi a più strati: partendo dal basso una rete con le sue proprietà emergenti diventa il nodo di una rete di secondo livello, cioè un automa di secondo livello che interagisce con altri automi dello stesso tipo e così via. Nei sistemi inorganici, dove non esiste un progetto, si distinguono di norma solo due livelli, quello dei costituenti elementari e quello su scala macroscopica. I sistemi fisici sono riconducibili a poche leggi universali, che governano i costituenti elementari della materia, ma il passaggio dalla descrizione dalla piccola alla grande scala è impervio e consentito soltanto dalla simulazione numerica, quando ci allontaniamo dalle situazioni più semplici caratterizzate da un equilibrio statistico. I limiti che il disegno riduzionista incontra già per i sistemi fisici diventano decisamente più forti nel caso dei sistemi complessi. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...) other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed. (shrink)

Kosmovisi Adalah Istilah yang seharusnya berarti seperangkat fondasi yang darinya muncul pemahaman sistemik tentang Alam Semesta, komponen-komponennya sebagai kehidupan, dunia tempat kita hidup, alam, fenomena manusia, dan hubungan mereka. Oleh karena itu, ini adalah bidang filsafat analitis yang disuplai oleh ilmu pengetahuan, yang tujuannya adalah pengetahuan yang terkumpul dan berkelanjutan secara epistemologis tentang segala sesuatu yang ada dan terkandung dalam diri kita, yang mengelilingi kita, dan yang berhubungan dengan kita dengan cara apa pun. Ini adalah sesuatu yang sama tuanya dengan (...) pemikiran manusia, dan, selain menggunakan unsur-unsur kosmologi ilmiah, ini mencakup segala sesuatu dalam filsafat dan sains yang mengacu pada alam semesta dan kehidupan. Kosmovisi bukanlah sekumpulan ide, hipotesis, dan asumsi, melainkan sebuah sistem yang didasarkan pada observasi, analisis, bukti, dan demonstrasi. Tidak ada kosmovisi yang bermaksud untuk mendefinisikan, menetapkan, atau mengusulkan, tetapi hanya memahami, menganalisis, dan menafsirkan. Masing-masing dari kita membangun dan membawa kosmovisi-nya sepanjang hidup, tanpa menetapkan bentuk, sebagai latar belakang pemikiran dan perilaku kita. Secara linguistic, Istilah "kosmovisi" akan berasal dari padanan bahasa Jerman untuk konsep "Weltanschauung", seperti yang digunakan oleh beberapa filsuf. Namun, hubungan linguistic ini tidak dapat diterapkan karena bertentangan dengan apa yang kami usulkan sebagai kosmovisi. Kata Jerman ini mengacu pada visi pra-logis atau proto-eksperimental tentang realitas, dengan konteks intuitif dan jauh dari pengetahuan kritis yang masih belum ada pada saat perumusannya. Tidak diragukan lagi, kosmovisi, dalam pengertian yang kita pahami, menampung dan menggunakan elemen-elemen proto-eksperimental atau pra-logis yang mencakup sejarah, ketidaksadaran kolektif, dan semua pola dasar yang kita bawa. Namun, dalam konsep yang kami terapkan di sini, kosmovisi jauh melampaui konten ini, pertama-tama dengan terus-menerus menyerahkannya untuk menghadirkan pemikiran kritis dan akhirnya dengan menjadikan pengalaman analitik (dan bukan pemikiran itu sendiri atau intuisi) sebagai alam semesta yang sebenarnya. António Lopes memaparkan luasnya konten ini: -/- "Kosmovisi bukanlah produk dari pemikiran. Mereka tidak muncul dari keinginan sederhana untuk mengetahui. Pemahaman tentang realitas adalah momen penting dalam konfigurasinya, tetapi, bagaimanapun, itu hanya satu. Itu berasal dari perilaku vital, dari pengalaman hidup, dari struktur totalitas psikis kita. Peningkatan kehidupan menuju kesadaran dalam pengetahuan tentang realitas, dalam penilaian kehidupan dan dalam realitas kehendak adalah pekerjaan yang lambat dan sulit yang telah dilakukan umat manusia dalam pengembangan konsepsi kehidupan. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)" . Dalam karya ini, kami berusaha menguraikan sebuah visi kosmik berdasarkan realitas yang ditawarkan sains saat ini. Kami tidak mengusulkan, kapan pun, untuk melakukan sains atau berteori tentang filsafat. Namun, kami akan selalu berusaha untuk didukung oleh mereka atau, setidaknya, dilindungi oleh mereka dari distorsi kognitif yang biasanya kita bawa. (shrink)

Cova et al. (2019) have tested people's beliefs on aesthetic disagreement using experiments based on questionnaires. Since the vast majority of people chose answers that are incompatible with aesthetic intersubjectivism, Cova et al. claim that the aesthetics literature is misguided in assuming that ordinary people are intersubjectivists. Contesi et al. (2024) argue that those results are not in contrast with the aesthetics literature, given that folk intersubjectivism is generally understood as an implicit commitment, rather than an explicit belief; its presence, (...) therefore, cannot be inferred from people’s “explicit avowals”. Contesi et al. support their understanding of the literature by citing passages from contemporary philosophers. I argue that these passages fail to demonstrate that folk aesthetic intersubjectivism is regarded as implicit. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial (BPS) model in psychiatry has come under fire for being too vague to be of any practical use in the clinic. For many, its central flaw consists in lack of scientific validity and philosophical coherence: the model never specified how biological, psychological and social factors causally integrate with one another. Recently, advances in the cognitive sciences have made great strides towards meeting this very ‘integration challenge.’ The paper begins by illustrating how enactivist and predictive processing frameworks propose converging (...) accounts of biopsychosocial integration that are far superior to those of previous theories. It argues, however, that the main problem of implementing the BPS model has less to do with integration than with the lack of a social etiology. Psychiatric practice leans heavily towards ‘bio’ and ‘psycho’ approaches, without an equally developed set of explanatory and therapeutic resources for dealing with the ‘social’ dimension of illness. This leaves psychiatry essentially internalist in orientation. As illustrated most poignantly by conditions such as functional neurological disorders, internalism comes with the risks of stigma and the curtailment of therapeutic possibilities. The paper argues that the answer to the failings of the BPS model lies in combining the integration challenge with the development of an ‘externalist psychiatry,’ which casts both causes and treatment of psychiatric illness onto the social environment. The following two papers explore the conditions that might make this idea a reality. (shrink)

Philosophical speculation about how psychiatric externalism might function in practice has yet to fully consider the multitude of externalist psychiatric systems that exist beyond the bounds of modern psychiatry. Believing that anthropology can inform philosophical debate on the matter, the paper illustrates one such case. The discussion is based on 19 months of first-hand ethnographic fieldwork among Akha, a group of swidden farmers living in highland Laos and neighboring borderlands. First, the paper describes the Akha set of medicinal, ritual, and (...) shamanic practices, analyzing issues of stigma and medical pluralism within it. Second, it makes the case that the Akha realize a functioning biopsychosocial system which comes with a well-developed set of resources for treating the social dimension of illness. Externalism among the Akha re-frames psychiatric illness as a ‘problem in living,’ which becomes manageable as such. The paper claims that, in so doing, the Akha system succeeds in many of the areas where modern internalist psychiatry falls short, and that it does so because Akha society is structured in such a way so that its practitioners can shift the social environment around the patient. As a takeaway for philosophers, it suggests that the development of an externalist psychiatry must begin from questioning the accepted ontology of the social causes of psychiatric illness. (shrink)

Response to commentaries on the three-paper set 'Outline for an externalist psychiatry'.

Any progress in shaping up an externalist psychiatry, so previous discussion suggested, must begin from questions about the ontology of social causation. So far, research and theory have adhered to a naturalistic approach to the social causes of illness, concentrating mostly on the ‘social determinants of mental health’ (inequality, discrimination, housing insecurity, etc.). The paper starts with an assessment of ‘social determinants’ through the lens of epidemiology and critical psychiatry. It illustrates existing practical and political approaches that fight these constraints (...) and it highlights their therapeutic value. It argues, though, that a focus on social determinants is not sufficient for fully realizing externalism because a great portion of sociogenic illness remains causally indeterminate. Alongside political action, externalism requires a social etiology that is established by virtue of the meaning that it holds for patients, rather than by virtue of its capacity to identify objective social causes of illness. This entails abandoning naturalism about social causation and embracing constructivism. The paper shows that this methodological shift is less contradictory and more effective than it is commonly imagined. Drawing from further anthropological evidence, it concludes that only by lending support to projects that balance a focus on constraints with social construction will psychiatry be truly externalist. At stake is a prospect of effective treatment for sociogenic illness for the countless in struggle. (shrink)

Se examina la defensa que de la filosofía en cuanto episteme, elaboró el aristotélico renacentista Cesare Cremonini (1550-1 631), al introducir el curso de lecciones sobre la Física de Aristóteles, según la redacci6n todavía inédita del Ms.200-2 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Padua. Mediante un topos ya clásico, y actual, los temas en discusión son además de la falta de certitudo y la inconsistencia veritativa que afectan las conclusiones de la filosofía de la naturaleza, la inutilidad e incluso la peligrosidad (...) que, desde el punto de vista ético- político, parecen descalificar la labor del filósofo ociosamente levantar sospechas y alarma. La interpretación de la réplica cremoniniana intenta establecer conexiones entre el perfil conceptual de los argumentos esgrimidos, y algunos episodios de la biografía intelectual y académica de Crernonini sin dejar de tomar en cuenca las implicaciones políticas que pueden derivarse, en perspectiva histórica, del amplio debate que caracterizó la vida académica y cultural del estudio de Padua y de la república veneciana, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVI.The defence of philosophy as episteme is examined, as elaborated by Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher Cesare Cremonini (1550 - 1 631) in his as yet unpublished manuscript numbered 200-2 by t he University of Padua. Which purported to be an introduction for a course on Aristotle's Physics. Following a topos both classic and contemporary, the issues arc, in addition to the lack of certitudet and the inconsistency of truth concerning the philosophy of nature. The uselessness and even the ethical-political danger arising from the work of the idle philosopher devoted to the contemplation of truth, whose presence in society may stir suspicion and unrest. The analysis of Cremonini’s arguments intends to establish the connections between the philosopher's views and his own academic and intellectual circumstances. Also the political implications are taken into account that resulted from the wide-range debate typical of academic and cultural life in the Studio of Padua and the Republic of Venice during the second half of the 16th Century. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

It is common to distinguish between disagreement in the state sense (being in disagreement) and disagreement in the activity sense (having a disagreement). This paper deals with the question of what it is for two people to have a disagreement. First, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes. I argue that this is not sufficient for having a disagreement: two people can express conflicting attitudes without having a disagreement. (...) Second, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement involves not only the expression of conflicting attitudes, but also the persuasive attempt to bring the other around to one’s view. I argue that this is not necessary for having a disagreement: two people can have a disagreement without trying to change each other’s minds. Finally, I put forward an alternative account that goes beyond the mere expression of conflicting attitudes, but that does not go as far as to posit the attempt to change someone’s mind. Having a disagreement, I submit, is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes and demanding agreement, that is, advancing the normative claim that the other should share one’s attitude. (shrink)

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...) satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes the (...) basic structure in a manner that makes it easier for citizens to behave justly towards one another and adopt autonomous choices. I then move to demonstrate the superiority of this normative impact solution to the problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis political liberalism, even when reasonable disagreement about justice is factored in. (shrink)

Entanglement is one of the most striking features of quantum mechanics, and yet it is not specifically quantum. More specific to quantum mechanics is the connection between entanglement and thermodynamics, which leads to an identification between entropies and measures of pure state entanglement. Here we search for the roots of this connection, investigating the relation between entanglement and thermodynamics in the framework of general probabilistic theories. We first address the question whether an entangled state can be transformed into another by (...) means of local operations and classical communication. Under two operational requirements, we prove a general version of the Lo-Popescu theorem, which lies at the foundations of the theory of pure-state entanglement. We then consider a resource theory of purity where free operations are random reversible transformations, modelling the scenario where an agent has limited control over the dynamics of a closed system. Our key result is a duality between the resource theory of entanglement and the resource theory of purity, valid for every physical theory where all processes arise from pure states and reversible interactions at the fundamental level. As an application of the main result, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between entropies and measures of pure bipartite entanglement and exploit it to define entanglement measures in the general probabilistic framework. In addition, we show a duality between the task of information erasure and the task of entanglement generation, whereby the existence of entropy sinks (systems that can absorb arbitrary amounts of information) becomes equivalent to the existence of entanglement sources (correlated systems from which arbitrary amounts of entanglement can be extracted). (shrink)

Some of the manuscripts once part of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s collection transmit autograph notes, which have been useful to reconstruct his library. A peculiar case is represented by the notes transmitted in a codex containing the Latin translation of Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. These notes are actual corrections to the translation made mostly on the basis of a comparison with the Hebrew text, while in some other cases they derive from a specific interpretation. The aim of this (...) paper is to present some characteristics of the textual revisions, in particular with reference to the Hebrew source. The palaeographic data demonstrate Pico’s direct involvement, which leads to the question of the authorship of these notes, namely if they were the result of an autonomous work or of a collaboration with some other scholar. (shrink)

El artículo examina un episodio curioso, ocurrido en las relaciones de Galileo Galilei y de su amigo Giovanfrancesco Sagredo -el destacado personaje del Diálogo sobre los dos máximos sistemas del mundo- con el filósofo aristotélico Cesare Cremonini. Estando todavía de profesor en Padua, Galilei entrega al colega y amigo Cremonini, en forma de préstamo, la cuantiosa suma de cuatrocientos ducados. Al trasladarse de Padua a Florencia, el científico confía a Sagredo la tarea de recuperar el dinero prestado. Las cartas numerosas (...) que Sagredo dirigiera a Galilei a tal propósito, nos informan que la cancelación total del préstamo tardó nueve años (1619), gracias a las reiteradas intromisiones del patricio veneciano. Es opinión común de los historiadores, que la tardanza fue causada simplemente por la morosidad y la mala conducta seguida por Cremonini. El autor, en cambio, sugiere una interpretación diferente de los hechos; al tomar en cuenta, de un lado, la presencia de factores financieros que hicieron subir el costo de la deuda; del otro, la forma agresiva con que Sagredo llevó adelante el cuidado de los intereses de Galilei, hasta el extremo de levantar en Cremonini la sospecha de ser objeto de maniobras usureras. (shrink)

We review a recent approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics inspired by quantum information theory. The approach is based on a general framework, which allows one to address a large class of physical theories which share basic information-theoretic features. We first illustrate two very primitive features, expressed by the axioms of causality and purity-preservation, which are satisfied by both classical and quantum theory. We then discuss the axiom of purification, which expresses a strong version of the Conservation of Information (...) and captures the core of a vast number of protocols in quantum information. Purification is a highly non-classical feature and leads directly to the emergence of entanglement at the purely conceptual level, without any reference to the superposition principle. Supplemented by a few additional requirements, satisfied by classical and quantum theory, it provides a complete axiomatic characterization of quantum theory for finite dimensional systems. (shrink)

In quantum theory every state can be diagonalized, i.e. decomposed as a convex combination of perfectly distinguishable pure states. This elementary structure plays an ubiquitous role in quantum mechanics, quantum information theory, and quantum statistical mechanics, where it provides the foundation for the notions of majorization and entropy. A natural question then arises: can we reconstruct these notions from purely operational axioms? We address this question in the framework of general probabilistic theories, presenting a set of axioms that guarantee that (...) every state can be diagonalized. The first axiom is Causality, which ensures that the marginal of a bipartite state is well defined. Then, Purity Preservation states that the set of pure transformations is closed under composition. The third axiom is Purification, which allows to assign a pure state to the composition of a system with its environment. Finally, we introduce the axiom of Pure Sharpness, stating that for every system there exists at least one pure effect occurring with unit probability on some state. For theories satisfying our four axioms, we show a constructive algorithm for diagonalizing every given state. The diagonalization result allows us to formulate a majorization criterion that captures the convertibility of states in the operational resource theory of purity, where random reversible transformations are regarded as free operations. (shrink)

In epoca medievale si è molto discusso su alcuni concetti chiave come prova o giustificazione. La teoria della prova contenuta nei trattati di logica medievale prende il nome tecnico di consequentia, che è un tipo di ragionamento fondato sul passaggio dalla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati antecedenti alla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati conseguenti. Questo tipo di teoria ha avuto un correlato a livello dei singoli termini che compongono l’enunciato all'interno della teoria (...) nota come suppositio terminorum. Prende, infatti, il nome di descensus, la regola che permette la verifica del passaggio da un termine maggiore (un termine comune) ad un termine minore (che denota individui). La stessa definizione di alcune ramificazioni della teoria della suppositio è col-legata alla possibilità di ammettere o meno il descensus cioè questa "discesa" da un termine comune ad una congiunzione o disgiunzione di termini singolari. Il presente lavoro intende descrivere la teoria del descensus come un tipo particolare di consequentia mostrandone le connessioni con le moderne tecniche logiche. I trattati che si affronteranno appartengono al XIV e al XV secolo, cioè ad un periodo caratterizzato da una sistemazione della materia che li rende confrontabili con un quadro teorico unitario. (shrink)

Balancing a hermeneutic of trust with a hermeneutic of suspicion, this article develops a phenomenological description of imagination that highlights its alethic ambiguity. Imagination is an act of disclosure, without which the world of fiction and pure possibility cannot be constituted. Imagination is also an act of self-indulgence and narcissism, the source of much concealment and untruth. It is not the one or the other, but both at the same time, essentially ambiguous because of its phenomenological constitution. In this article, (...) I will take some steps towards clarifying this essential ambiguity of the imagination by drawing on the insights of Husserl and Sartre. Beginning with Husserl’s parallel treatment of imagination and perception as intuitive, objectifying acts, I will argue, drawing on insights from Sartre, that there is an important discrepancy between them with respect to the role of desire. While the constitution of perceptual presence is inseparable from a desire for truth, the desire involved in the constitution of imaginary presence has an ambiguous character, both epistemic and magical. This duplicity of desire partly accounts for the ambiguity of imagination, which is all the more pronounced the more the imagination demands the full emotional involvement of the imagining subject. (shrink)

Advances in neuroscience implicate reentrant signaling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. This principle was used in a series of masking experiments that defy explanation by feed-forward theories. The masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. Two masking processes were found: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size. This later process is called (...) masking by object substitution, because it occurs whenever there is a mismatch between the reentrant visual representation and the ongoing lower level activity. Iterative reentrant processing was formalized in a computational model that provides an excellent fit to the data. The model provides a more comprehensive account of all forms of visual masking than do the long-held feed-forward views based on inhibitory contour interactions. (shrink)

Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist (...) picture of human action. This book challenges that picture and calls on philosophers to wake up to the power of mindlessness: it is our habits, skills and conventions that help us cope with a world way too diverse for us to hope to always reinterpret it. The book presents the empirical evidence that has been accumulating over the last few decades and offers a philosophical analysis of mindless phenomena such as habits, skilled activity, automatic actions, emotional and spontaneous reactions and social conventions, arguing that traditional philosophical theories of action should be revised to do justice to this forgotten but important part of our lives: when we act mindlessly, we are free and fully rational even though we neither deliberate nor are aware of what we are doing. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario, in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson's argument to empirical test by asking (...) people what they should do in the new trilemma case, in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson's argument. But Thomson's argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible?exactly what Thomson's argument had predicted. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the issue (...) of coherence within Frankfurt’s philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm. (shrink)

I argue that it is possible for prospective mothers to wrong prospective fathers by bearing their child; and that lifting paternal liability for child support does not correct the wrong inflicted to fathers. It is therefore sometimes wrong for prospective mothers to bear a child, or so I argue here. I show that my argument for considering the legitimate interests of prospective fathers is not a unique exception to an obvious right to procreate. It is, rather, part of a growing (...) consensus that procreation can be morally problematic and that generally talking of rights in this context might not be warranted. Finally, I argue that giving up a right to procreate does not imply nor suggest giving up on women’s absolute right to abort, which I defend. (shrink)